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Rising health care expenditures have been a concern to policy-makers in al-
most all industrialised countries for the past decades. Two of the main driving
forces of exploding health care expenditures are technological progress and
demographic change. Both factors, however, are diﬃcult to control by policy-
makers. They can address a third factor contributing to high costs: Ineﬃ-
ciencies in the health production process. Since the inpatient sector usually
accounts for the major part of health care expenditures, analysing hospital
eﬃciency has become an important issue of the health economics literature
(compare the discussion of the literature below).
This paper gives a comprehensive evaluation of hospital ineﬃciency by fo-
cusing on costs and proﬁts. Based on a unique data set, we perform both cost
and proﬁt eﬃciency analyses within the framework of stochastic frontier anal-
ysis. For the analysis, we combine the Hospital Statistics administered by the
Statistical Oﬃces of the German Federal States with the Hospital Database
of the RWI Essen for the years 2002 to 2005. The data include detailed in-
formation on costs per hospital, the number as well as the demographics of
the patients, and information on revenues and proﬁts. The goal is to explain
diﬀerences in ineﬃciencies across hospital ownership types. The main contri-
bution of this study is twofold. First, it is the ﬁrst study that analyses proﬁt
eﬃciency of German hospitals. Second, it is, to the best of our knowledge, the
ﬁrst paper that conducts a cost- and proﬁt-eﬃciency analysis of hospitals with
the same data set, giving us the opportunity to directly compare the results
and interpret the diﬀerences between both types of eﬃciency analyses.
Theory clearly suggests that in competitive markets private organisations
work more eﬃciently than public ones (Villalonga, 2000). Consequently, one
solution to address ineﬃciencies in the hospital sector is to introduce more
competition and subsequently reduce regulation, opening the doors for pri-
vatisation of public hospitals. Indeed, a large number of public hospitals have
been privatised over the past ten years.1 From 1991 to 2007, the share of
all public hospitals has decreased from 46% to 32% whereas the share of all
private hospitals has increased from 15% to 30%. The share of non-proﬁt hos-
pitals has remained relatively constant at 38–39% over the same period of time
1The German hospital industry is characterised by the simultaneous existence of various
ownership types. Following the deﬁnition of the Statistical Oﬃces of the L¨ ander, three hos-
pital types are distinguished: public, non-proﬁt, and private hospitals. Non-proﬁt hospitals
are also private, i.e. non-public, but, in contrast to private hospitals, they are run by non-
proﬁt organisations mainly by churches, some by miners’ associations. Thus, in this paper
the term ‘private’ is used synonymously for ‘private for-proﬁt’.
4(Statistisches Bundesamt, 2007).2
Whether privatisation of public hospitals leads to better health outcomes
and better use of scarce resources is a yet insuﬃciently answered question.
Most empirical studies concerning US hospital eﬃciency ﬁnd that private hos-
pitals are less cost eﬃcient than the respective base groups (e.g. Zuckerman,
Hadley and Iezzoni, 1994; Rosko, 2001; Rosko, 2004; Ozcan, Luke and Hak-
sever, 1992).3 Based on a stochastic frontier analysis, Herr (2008) conﬁrms
this result for German hospitals.4 Hence, this result seems to be robust to the
diﬀerent health care systems schemes in the US and Germany.
The diﬀerence between the theoretical prediction and the empirical evi-
dence on eﬃciency seems to be puzzling. One explanation may be that the-
oretical models assume cost minimising behaviour equally for all hospitals,
regardless of the ownership type. This assumption may be true for non-proﬁt
hospitals, but private hospitals rather seek maximise proﬁts to satisfy the pri-
vate investors, for example. Maximising proﬁts involves a simultaneous choice
over the optimal input and output mix such that costs are minimised and rev-
enues are maximised.5 Berger and Mester (1997) argue that maximised proﬁts
are achieved by raising revenues at the expense of higher costs. In fact, our
data and Augurzky et al. (2008) show that in Germany private hospitals have
substantially higher proﬁt margins than non-proﬁt hospitals while they have
higher costs per bed and per treated case.
Proﬁt eﬃciency has been analysed ﬁrst and foremost in the US banking
industry (Akhavein, Berger and Humphrey, 1997; Berger and Mester, 1997;
Kumbhakar, 2006) or in agriculture (Kumbhakar, 2001; Ali and Flinn, 1994;
Ali, Parikh and Shah, 1994). Even though there is a large literature on cost
eﬃciency, there are only two proﬁt eﬃciency studies focusing on the health
care market. For instance, Bradford and Craycraft (1996) estimate the ef-
fects of the Medicare reforms in 1983 on the level of ineﬃciency of capital
expenditures using a stochastic proﬁt frontier. Their study, however, does
not distinguish between diﬀerent ownership types. Knox, Blankmeyer and
Stutzman (1981) analyse economic eﬃciency of nursing homes in Texas and
ﬁnd private providers to be more allocative and technical eﬃcient than public
nursing homes using OLS techniques.
2However, German private general hospitals still only supply 16% of the beds compared
to 35% of the beds provided by non-proﬁt and 49% by public general hospitals in 2007.
3Hollingsworth (2008, 2003) provides an extensive overview on international cost and
technical eﬃciency studies of the health care market.
4Using DEA, Tiemann and Schrey¨ ogg (2008) come to the same conclusion regarding the
eﬃciency of private hospitals in Germany in a later study.
5Hoerger (1991) shows that indeed non-proﬁt and private hospitals responded diﬀerently
to changes in the health care system in the US in the years 1983 to 1988.
5Similar to most hospital markets, the German market is regulated in several
diﬀerent aspects and leaves, at ﬁrst sight, little room for proﬁt maximising be-
haviour. The new prospective payment system introduced in 2004 ﬁxes prices
for medical services based on the patients’ diagnosis related group (DRG). Hos-
pitals have nevertheless avenues to increase their revenues, either by attracting
and treating more patients with complex needs and – to a certain extent – by
oﬀering additional services. They may also treat more patients with complex
diagnoses to exploit cost reducing economies of scale. In the DRG system a
higher level of complexity measured by the case-mix index (CMI) increases
both remuneration and costs. Thus, in a cost-eﬃciency analysis hospitals with
a large amount of complex diagnoses might be considered less cost-eﬃcient.
In fact, in Germany, private hospitals have a higher CMI than public hospi-
tals (compare our data discussed below or Augurzky, Budde, Krolop, Schmidt,
Schmidt, Schmitz, Schwierz and Terkatz (2008)).
The next section outlines the estimation strategy and describes the data.
Results and robustness checks are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 Estimation Strategy and Data
2.1 Estimation Strategy
Ineﬃciency is deﬁned as the hospital’s deviation from the estimated or con-
structed cost or proﬁt frontier. In the case of cost ineﬃciency, a hospital does
not choose a cost-minimising input mix given input prices (input-allocative
ineﬃciency) even though it may be technically eﬃcient and produce on the
technical frontier. In the case of revenue ineﬃciency, a hospital fails to max-
imise revenues because of either or both of two sources: output-oriented tech-
nical ineﬃciency (less than possible output produced given input use) and
production of an inappropriate output mix in light of a prevailing output price
vector. Finally, proﬁt eﬃciency is the product of technical and both allocative
eﬃciencies as well as a certain type of scale eﬃciency.
As explained in greater detail in Herr (2008),when measuring cost eﬃciency
it is assumed that all hospitals seek to minimise costs (Coelli, Rao and Battese,
2005; Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).6 Analogously to Herr (2008), we specify











+ βy lnyi + vi + ui. (1)
6Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) provide a complete summary of both the theory and
techniques used in Stochastic Frontier Production, Cost, and Proﬁt Analysis.
6Ci are the observed total adjusted costs of hospital i, yi is the output and βn
and βy are the vectors of the respective coeﬃcients to be estimated. The K
input prices wi =[ w1i,...,wKi] of inputs xi =[ x1i,...,xKi] are calculated by
dividing the costs for each input by its quantities used (e.g. number of doctors).
Since a cost frontier must be linearly homogeneous in input prices, one input
price wki is chosen to normalise total costs and the other input prices wni.
Estimation results do not depend on this choice. We further assume that the
environment is characterised by standard normally distributed random noise
vi and systematic hospital speciﬁc ineﬃciency ui. The ineﬃciency term ui
is assumed to be non-negative. The distribution of the two error terms is
characterised below.
When estimating proﬁt eﬃciency, hospitals are assumed to seek to max-
imise proﬁts. The analysis of proﬁt eﬃciency focuses on the short-run where
hospitals face input rigidities. In the long-run, ineﬃcient hospitals would exit
competitive markets with marginal cost pricing and variable inputs.7 Following
Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000), the proﬁt frontier maps maximum proﬁts pos-
sible given exogenously ﬁxed output prices, prices of variable inputs (labour),
and quantities of quasi-ﬁxed inputs such as the number of installed beds. The
assumption that hospitals behave as price takers is plausible for a ﬁxed price
DRG market as the German one. Output prices are exogenously ﬁxed and
probably do not correspond with marginal costs.
As Coelli et al. (2005) note, no particular proﬁt eﬃciency methodology has
become widely used to date. The reasons are two-fold: Firstly, maximising
proﬁts means simultaneously to minimise costs and maximise revenues which
makes the empirical identiﬁcation of ineﬃciency more diﬃcult than in the
case of simple cost minimisation or revenue maximisation. Secondly, only
few datasets provide information on input and output prices, proﬁts, and the
utilisation of inputs.
In the stochastic frontier framework, we diﬀerentiate between two proﬁt
frontiers explained in detail below. The ﬁrst one is constructed analogously
to the cost frontier above. Variation in ineﬃciency is in this case solely due
to output allocative and technical ineﬃciency (model (i)). The second proﬁt
frontier additionally accounts for input allocative ineﬃciency by weighting the
normalised prices with the returns to scale of production. Furthermore, in the
second case, the output price, as opposed to one input price, is used for the
normalisation (model (ii)).
In the ﬁrst case, the proﬁt frontier of a single-equation model without input
7In competitive markets, duality between cost and proﬁt eﬃciency holds given prices
(Mas-Colell, Whinston and Green, 1995) which probably does not hold for the German
hospital industry.













+ βq lnqi + vi − ui, (2)
where πi is the observed proﬁt of hospital i, qi is a quasi-ﬁxed input, vi is ran-
dom noise and the proﬁt decreasing ineﬃciency is captured by a non-negative
systematic error term ui. Again, the frontier must be linearly homogeneous in
prices, that is why the same input price wki is chosen to normalise the proﬁts
and the other prices. In this case, the parameters of the proﬁt frontier can be
estimated consistently if input allocative eﬃciency is assumed, which means
that the inputs are used in an optimal combination to each other given input
prices and technology.8 Thus, we estimate the eﬀect of technical and output
allocative ineﬃciency on proﬁts assuming that output prices are ﬁxed.
In the second case, we ﬁrst need to calculate the returns to scale of produc-
tion. Let r =

n βn < 1 measure the degree of homogeneity of the production
function y = f(x,q;β)exp(−u)i nx, i.e. we estimate the production frontier
and sum across the coeﬃcients on the inputs x. Since we assume the produc-
tion function to be of a Cobb-Douglas type with a single output y, we can
estimate proﬁt eﬃciency in a single-equation model consistently if the nor-











+ δq lnqi + vπi − uπi, (3)
where πi are actually observed proﬁts, p is the exogenous output price, qi
are quantities of the quasi-ﬁxed input and wni are the variable input prices.
Furthermore, δ0 is a constant, δn = −1/(1 − r)βn ∀n, δq =( 1 /1 − r)βq, vπi =
1/(1 − r)vi and uπi is the overall normalised variable proﬁt eﬃciency, where
the ineﬃciency term uπi contains both, allocative and technical ineﬃciency,
which cannot be identiﬁed separately.
The literature oﬀers several approaches to model the non-negative sys-
tematic ineﬃciency component ui. For the three models described above, this
study follows the approach ﬁrst suggested by Deprins and Simar (1989) assum-
ing that hospital-speciﬁc factors zi =[ z1i,...,zLi] directly inﬂuence ineﬃciency.
Formally, ui ∼N+(z 
iδ,σ2
u), i.e. ui has a normal distribution truncated at zero
with mode z 
iδ varying over the hospitals and constant variance σ2
u. Note that
8Speciﬁcally, a ﬁrm is input allocative eﬃcient if the ratio of the partial derivatives of





8zi does not inﬂuence the deterministic part of the cost or proﬁt frontier. These
models are called ‘normal truncated normal’ models because one component
of the composite error is normally distributed while the other is truncated
normally distributed. In order to estimate our model, we use the one-step
procedure by Huang and Liu (1994) where we pool the years of observation
and cluster the standard deviations on hospital level. Due to the assumption
that the variance σ2
u is constant, the signs of the coeﬃcients δj correspond to
the signs of their marginal eﬀects on the unconditional expected ineﬃciency
(Wang, 2002).
To derive the log likelihood function, it is necessary to assume that ui and vi
are distributed independently of each other and of the regressors. Furthermore,
the estimates allow us to compute hospital-speciﬁc cost eﬃciency scores as
CEi = E[exp(−ui)|vi+ui] or proﬁt eﬃciency scores as PE i = E[exp(−ui)|vi−
ui], respectively. The estimated cost eﬃciency scores are consistent in a panel
data setting that allows for asymptotics along the time dimension (Kumbhakar
and Lovell, 2000). In Section 3.4, we discuss two other approaches conducted
as robustness checks.
2.2 Data
The data used in this study are extracted from the annual hospital and patient
statistics, which are collected and administered by the Statistical Oﬃces of the
German Federal States for the years 2002 to 2005 (Forschungsdatenzentrum
der Statistischen Landes¨ amter, 2002-2005). They include detailed informa-
tion on costs, number of doctors, nurses, beds, and patients characteristics.
We merge our data with information on proﬁts, sales, depreciations and costs
extracted from the hospital database of the RWI Essen which contains bal-
ance sheet information of 374 hospitals. In particular we know the hospitals’
EBITDA (Earnings before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortization),
EBIT (Earnings before Interest and Taxes), and EAT (Earnings After Taxes).
EBITDA subsumes earnings before interests and tax payments, depreciation,
and amortisation and represents the result of the operative business. EBIT
denotes earnings before interest and tax payments. EAT is deﬁned as earnings
after taxes which thus captures the ﬁnal result after subtracting all types of
expenses. We construct a fourth measure from the balance sheets by subtract-
ing total costs from total sales (before any reductions). In the following, we
will call this measure ”economic proﬁts” (EP). It is independent of diﬀerent
proﬁt reporting conventions across hospital types. As proﬁts may be negative,
we add a constant to each proﬁt variable for all observations in the sample
(compare e.g. Berger and Mester, 1997). The constant is the minimum value
of the respective proﬁt measure (that is, the highest loss in absolute terms)
9and leads to non-negative adjusted proﬁts in the entire sample. Finally, we
add the hospital-speciﬁc base rates (Basisfallwert)9 of the years 2003 to 2005,
the hospital-speciﬁc case-mix index (CMI) of the year 2004, and information
on the regional structure (urban or rural) on postal code level from publicly
available sources.10
The sample used in the analysis contains 1,026 observations from 374 hos-
pitals excluding hospitals not receiving any public subsidies11, university hos-
pitals, and those with less than 100 beds (32 observations in total). Monetary
variables are deﬂated to 2000 prices. The unit of analysis is either a single
hospital or a small chain of hospitals (with up to 12 hospitals). Some small
chains do not publish balance sheets for each single member but consolidated
balance sheets. In this case we cannot decompose the diﬀerent proﬁts for the
single hospitals within the chain and, therefore, we treat the small chain as
one (large) hospital with average case-mix index and base rate. Since usually
small chains encompass hospitals within a speciﬁc region which work closely
together, this procedure is justiﬁed.
Table 1 reports summary statistics of the variables used in the analysis
presented separately by ownership type. In general, big hospitals are overrep-
resented in this sample compared to the whole population of German general
hospitals because they are more likely to publish their balance sheets than
small hospitals. For a better comparability across hospitals, we choose total
adjusted costs as the main cost variable. They are adjusted by subtracting
costs for research and ambulatory care from total hospital costs. Input prices
for labour such as doctors, nursing services, and other staﬀ are calculated
by dividing the costs incurred per group by its number of full-time equiva-
lent employees. We distinguish three diﬀerent generated capital prices in the
cost frontier.12 The ﬁrst capital price, medical requirements per case, includes
material costs for all medical requirements (pharmaceuticals, medical instru-
ments, transplants, etc.) and is divided by the number of cases. The second
and the third capital prices are generated by dividing administrative costs and
9The hospital-speciﬁc base rate and the potential number of cases weighted by their case-
mix determine a hospital’s budget. The revenues the hospital ﬁnally receives for a certain
case are the product of the cost weight of a case (depending on the severity of the case and
equal for all hospitals) and the base rate.
10Base rates and case-mix index originate from the AOK (the biggest German insurance
fund). Since base rates were introduced in 2003 we use the same base rates for 2003 in 2002.
11Hospitals which do not receive public subsidies are on average small and specialised and
probably not comparable to the other hospitals in our data.
12We thus reﬁne our cost model of Herr (2008) using two more capital prices and deﬁning
the price for medical needs rather by the number of cases treated than by the number
of installed beds. In that way, we may account for the origination of capital costs more
precisely. Results do not depend on this choice.
10Table 1: The Hospital Statistics: Mean values and standard deviations of selected variables
Total Public Non-proﬁt Private
variable mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d mean s.d.
costs and proﬁts
EBIT/sales [in %] 0.349 6.310 -1.246 4.957 -0.132 4.643 5.757 9.207
EBITDA/sales [in %] 7.761 6.779 6.804 5.285 6.326 5.579 13.477 9.396
EAT/sales [in %] 0.132 5.299 -0.949 4.703 -0.052 4.515 3.491 6.842
Economic Proﬁts/sales in [%] -0.0005 0.0085 -0.0009 0.0125 -0.0003 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004
adjusted costs / beds 33,306 13,215 32,949 7,164 31,328 7,992 38,546 26,815
adjusted costs / case 2,828 1,022 2,747 476 2,736 608 3,250 2,134
output
no. weighted of cases 15,615 13,777 19,226 16,907 13,128 9,509 11,079 8,520
unweighted no. of cases 15,734 13,366 19,461 16,062 13,252 9,617 10,867 8,561
inputs
doctorsa 94 101 1 1 8 1 2 8 7 76 36 65 2
nurses 261 252 325 319 216 159 186 142
other staﬀ 296 335 385 438 232 182 191 157
number of beds 1,298 1,049 1,569 1,243 1,130 805 916 678
input and output prices
costs per nurseb 42,304 5,364 43,772 4,729 42,239 4,470 38,421 6,681
costs per docb 83,021 10,302 84,180 9,010 82,739 9,562 80,454 14,048
costs per other staﬀ 40,450 5,938 40,344 5,541 41,126 5,821 39,283 6,986
medical requirements/ casec 506 342 465 146 472 264 689 667
administrative costs/ bedd 835 698 777 515 794 330 1,080 1,358
other material costs/ bedd 5,534 2,685 5,327 1,684 5,307 1,749 6,588 5,193
base rate 2,698 321 2,729 302 2,652 304 2,710 390
exogenous variables
eastern Germanye 0.30 0.46 0.26 0.44 0.23 0.42 0.53 0.50
urban 0.52 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.64 0.48 0.49 0.50
ratio of elderly patientsf 0.21 0.08 0.21 0.05 0.21 0.10 0.21 0.09
surgery-ratio 0.41 0.25 0.43 0.22 0.39 0.26 0.38 0.30
ratio of female patients 0.55 0.07 0.55 0.05 0.55 0.09 0.54 0.08
HHIf 0.43 0.28 0.53 0.29 0.30 0.22 0.41 0.25
further characteristics
length of stay 8.64 2.42 8.20 1.25 8.84 2.77 9.45 3.54
mortality-ratio per 1,000 26.09 13.24 25.76 8.02 25.78 13.23 27.66 21.91
doctors per 1,000 cases 5.69 2.03 5.62 1.26 5.56 1.57 6.15 3.81
nurses per 1,000 inpatient day 1.98 0.49 1.98 0.31 1.96 0.58 2.04 0.64
Case Mix Index (953 Obs.) 1.02 0.37 0.96 0.18 1.00 0.22 1.24 0.76
Sample size N 1,026 477 375 174
Source: Final sample of the Hospital Statistics, Statistical Oﬃces of the L¨ ander, Germany.
Economic Proﬁts (EP)= sales-total costs)/ sales, a: number of full time equivalent
employees, b: costs per full time equivalent employee (other staﬀ= total number of
employees minus doctors minus nurses), d: Costs for medical requirements (including drugs,
transplants, implants) per unweighted case, e: Equals one if located in eastern Germany,
including Berlin, f: Hirshman-Herﬁndahl Index (HHI) measured as squared market share
[in installed beds] of each hospital (chain) per county
11the remaining material cost category all other material costs, respectively, by
the number of installed beds. When estimating proﬁt eﬃciency, we assume
that the number of installed beds is a quasi-ﬁxed input, which then serves as
the measure for capital use instead of its price. Thus, we only keep the ﬁrst of
the three capital prices in the proﬁt frontier. The hospital’s output used in the
cost frontier is the number of weighted cases. Analogously to Herr (2008), we
construct weights based on the across-hospital average length of stay of each
diagnosis relative to the overall length of stay assuming that the length of stay
is correlated to the severity of illness.13 The base rate serves as the price of
one weighted case in the proﬁt frontier. It is regulated and adjusted on an
annual basis and may not be comparable to market prices used in other eﬃ-
ciency studies, e.g. in agriculture. However, it reﬂects the current price level,
because the revenues for a certain case are the product of the cost weight of
a case (depending on the severity of the case and equal for all hospitals) and
the hospital-speciﬁc base rate. Hence, diﬀerent hospitals receive diﬀerent re-
imbursements for the same treatments. The base rate is set annually based on
former budgets and case-mix weighted utilisation of the hospitals.
The following exogenous variables are included in all models to control
for observable heterogeneity and to assess their direct eﬀect on ineﬃciency.
The dummy variable eastern Germany diﬀerentiates between hospitals located
in eastern Germany (including Berlin) and those in western Germany. The
Hirshman-Herﬁndahl index (HHI), deﬁned as the squared market share of
installed beds of hospitals and hospital chains per county, accounts for the
degree of competition the hospital faces. The ratio of female patients, of elderly
patients of at least 75 years of age, and of patients receiving surgeries are used
to control for case-mix diﬀerences (Zuckerman et al., 1994). Unfortunately,
the data do not provide any quality measures other than in-hospital mortality
rates. Above average quality, which is probably more expensive, may also be
captured by higher cost ineﬃciency or lower proﬁt ineﬃciency.
In 2004 there was a fundamental reform of the remuneration system of
hospitals in Germany. The new system is mainly based on diagnosis related
groups (DRGs) and thus accounts for case severity. Until 2004, to a large
degree, remuneration was proportional to length of stay and costs of treatment.
Our data covers the period from 2002 to 2005 which includes the change in
the system. To account for eﬀects of the reform as well as other time trends,
we include dummy variables for each year in most of the models to capture
13For robustness checks, we use the hospital speciﬁc Case-Mix-Index (CMI) to weight the
number of cases. We observe the CMI only for one year, hence we lose 74 observations,
which causes problems with the convergence rates in the general model. As it turns out
that it does not have any explanatory power in either of the models when including it as an
exogenous variable, we refrain from including the CMI in the ﬁnal speciﬁcations.
12technological change (in the proﬁt frontier) as well as to capture the change
of ineﬃciency over time (explaining the mode of the ineﬃciency distribution).
Due to technical reasons, we cannot control for each single year from 2002
to 2005 in the computation intensive one-step model with truncated normally
distributed ineﬃciency. Hence, we do only control for one year (year 2005, ﬁrst
year after the reform) in the proﬁt function. If we did not control for the year
of observation, we would assume that there is no technological change shifting
the frontier in the four-years period.
3 Results
3.1 Cost Eﬃciency
Estimation results of the cost eﬃciency model speciﬁed similar to the model
presented in Herr (2008) are shown in Table A-1 in the appendix. The ﬁrst
part of the table reports the coeﬃcients on the input prices. The input prices
positively inﬂuence the cost frontier. The model in which we control for tech-
nological change (left column) suggests that there had been cost decreasing
technological change in 2005 compared to the years 2002-2004. The coeﬃ-
cients of the exogenous variables in the second part of the table are read as
eﬀects on ineﬃciency. The coeﬃcients are jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from
zero, but not individually. Nevertheless, these results suggest that both private
and non-proﬁt hospitals are less cost eﬃcient than public hospitals in Germany
and are in line with the predictions of Herr (2008) and a deeper analysis of the
estimated eﬃciency scores presented in Section 3.4.
3.2 Proﬁt Eﬃciency
Tables 2 and 3 report the results on proﬁt eﬃciency with three out of four
diﬀerent proﬁt measures (EBIT, EBITDA, EAT, and EP) described in Sec-
tion 2.2.14 The two models use one-step SFA with normal truncated normal
distributed ineﬃciency. In the following, we diﬀerentiate between the two
approaches discussed in Section 2.1.
(i) Table 2 reports the results of the restricted model where we assume
that there is no input-allocative ineﬃciency (Equation (2)). In the model
which uses EBITDA as outcome measure all but one coeﬃcient of the proﬁt
function are individually signiﬁcant. F-tests indicate that the coeﬃcients of
the proﬁt functions are jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero in all models
14The data demanding models did not converge for all four proﬁt variables in all speciﬁ-
cations. Only converged models are presented.
13and both approaches.15 The coeﬃcient of the dummy variable for the ﬁrst
year after the reform (year 2005) is signiﬁcantly negative. This means that
ﬁrst technological change shifts the frontier over time and second that this
technological change is proﬁt decreasing.
The results of the second part of the table show the impact of exogenous
factors on hospital ineﬃciency where a negative signs means lower ineﬃciency
and thus higher eﬃciency. Our results suggest diﬀerences in the hospitals’
proﬁt eﬃciency across ownership types. In contrast to the results on cost
eﬃciency, under the assumption that all hospitals use inputs allocative eﬃ-
ciently, private hospitals are less proﬁt ineﬃcient than public hospitals. This
has several implications: First, it is in line with the ﬁndings of lower risks of
insolvency and closure of private hospitals (Augurzky et al., 2008). Second,
it shows that ﬁrms can simultaneously be less cost eﬃcient and more proﬁt
eﬃcient in price regulated markets. This means that private hospitals increase
revenues by producing at higher costs. Third, it may imply that private hos-
pitals maximise proﬁts rather than minimise costs. The main result is robust
to the way proﬁts are measured (see columns 2 to 4, Table 2).
With respect to the other exogenous variables, the results indicate that
hospitals in eastern Germany are more proﬁt eﬃcient considering EBITDA
as a proﬁt proxy but not when considering the other two proﬁt proxies as
outcomes. Non-proﬁt ownership increases proﬁt eﬃciency when considering
EBIT as a proxy for proﬁts. The HHI and the ratio of female or elderly
patients and of surgeries do not aﬀect proﬁt eﬃciency signiﬁcantly in model
(i).
Although we ﬁnd proﬁt decreasing technological change, Augurzky et al.
(2008) point out that proﬁt margins (proﬁts divided by sales) have increased
in the same time period. This suggests that proﬁts still increased relative to
sales. One possible reason is shown in the second part of the table. All three
year dummy variables have negative and signiﬁcant coeﬃcients which show
that proﬁt ineﬃciency has decreased over time. Tests on all coeﬃcients of the
exogenous variables being jointly zero (with and without the year dummies)
are rejected, i.e. the mode of proﬁt ineﬃciency is not constant but varies across
the hospitals.
(ii) In Table 3 we report results of a model that allows for allocative inef-
ﬁciency (Equation (3)). This is a more general model in which input prices
are divided by the base rate. Furthermore, input prices, the quasi-ﬁxed input
and the proﬁts are weighted by the returns to scale of the production function
15In contrast to the cost eﬃciency case, the signs of the coeﬃcients in the production
function are not clear a priori. While for example one more bed usually leads to higher
costs, it might lead to higher or lower proﬁts, depending on the actual number of beds
compared to the individually optimal number.
14Table 2: Proﬁt eﬃciency, truncated, SFA, model (i) – assuming input allocative
eﬃciency
EBITDA EBIT EAT
ln costs per doctors -0.255 0.006 -0.043
( 0.124 )∗∗ ( 0.036 ) ( 0.040 )
ln costs per other staﬀ -0.018 -0.004 0.003
( 0.133 ) ( 0.040 ) ( 0.039 )
ln medical requirements per case 0.166 0.044 0.028
( 0.042 )∗∗∗ ( 0.016 )∗∗∗ ( 0.015 )∗
ln base rate 0.746 0.017 0.161
( 0.051 )∗∗∗ ( 0.043 ) ( 0.012 )∗∗∗
ln beds 0.237 -0.006 0.005
( 0.023 )∗∗∗ ( 0.006 ) ( 0.005 )
year = 2005 -0.434 -0.191 -0.462
( 0.097 )∗∗∗ ( 0.082 )∗∗ ( 0.022 )∗∗∗
Const. 0.458 0.678 1.011
( 0.344 ) ( 0.164 )∗∗∗ ( 0.104 )∗∗∗
exogenous variables
private -0.229 -0.176 -0.140
(0.084)∗∗∗ (0.042)∗∗∗ (0.067)∗∗
non-proﬁt 0.013 -0.074 -0.081
(0.052) (0.035)∗∗ (0.056)
eastern Germany -0.128 -0.024 0.019
(0.053)∗∗ (0.041) (0.059)
urban -0.029 0.023 0.050
(0.048) (0.041) (0.061)
HHI -0.050 0.019 0.019
(0.083) (0.064) (0.091)
ratio of elderly patients 0.041 -0.043 -0.195
(0.271) (0.14) (0.139)
surgery-ratio -0.009 -0.094 -0.084
(0.073) (0.063) (0.077)
ratio of female patients 0.243 0.078 0.130
(0.316) (0.208) (0.139)
year = 2003 -1.739 -2.608 -3.639
(0.418)∗∗∗ (0.485)∗∗∗ (0.959)∗∗∗
year = 2004 -0.156 -0.197 -0.425
(0.038)∗∗∗ (0.034)∗∗∗ (0.050)∗∗∗
year = 2005 -1.013 0.294 -3.173
(0.421)∗∗ (0.104)∗∗∗ (1.293)∗∗
Constant 0.901 1.111 1.310
(0.177)∗∗∗ (0.114)∗∗∗ (0.092)∗∗∗
Obs. 1,026 1,026 1,026
Robust standard errors below coeﬃcients in parentheses. Clustered at
hospital level. Signiﬁcance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. The signs of the
exogenous variables’ coeﬃcients are to be read as eﬀects on ineﬃciency.
15Table 3: Proﬁt eﬃciency, general truncated SFA, model (ii) – allowing for
input allocative ineﬃciency and normalising with the output price (base rate)
EBIT EAT EP
ln costs per doctors -0.008 0.006 -0.002
( 0.073 ) ( 0.034 ) ( 0.027 )
ln costs per nurse 0.143 0.062 0.068
( 0.064 )∗∗ ( 0.035 )∗ ( 0.031 )∗∗
ln costs per other staﬀ -0.041 -0.025 -0.029
( 0.068 ) ( 0.033 ) ( 0.024 )
ln medical requirements per case -0.076 -0.032 -0.024
( 0.024 )∗∗∗ ( 0.012 )∗∗∗ ( 0.010 )∗∗
ln beds 0.008 0.004 -0.011
( 0.009 ) ( 0.005 ) ( 0.004 )∗∗
year = 2005 -2.903 -0.806 -3.554
( 0.089 )∗∗∗ ( 0.049 )∗∗∗ ( 0.059 )∗∗∗
Const. 7.278 6.965 10.844
( 0.365 )∗∗∗ ( 0.202 )∗∗∗ ( 0.224 )∗∗∗
exogenous variables
private -1.213 -0.770 -0.758
(1.290) (0.743) (0.615)
non-proﬁt -0.618 -0.402 -0.345
(0.718) (0.449) (0.336)
eastern Germany 0.14 0.08 0.112
(0.486) (0.379) (0.34)
urban = 1 0.299 0.268 0.487
(0.551) (0.441) (0.457)
HHI 0.086 0.192 0.126
(0.68) (0.595) (0.511)
ratio of elderly patients -0.384 -1.299 -1.741
(1.634) (1.367) (1.403)
surgery-ratio -0.696 -0.545 -0.541
(0.997) (0.7) (0.579)
ratio of female patients -1.575 0.892 0.119
(2.651) (0.861) (0.719)
year = 2003 -20.515 -23.027 -0.903
(16.879) (15.056) (0.367)∗∗
year = 2004 -2.363 -2.816 -27.020
(1.860) (1.619)∗ (19.797)
year = 2005 -9.798 -18.916 -12.271
(9.860) (15.510) (8.964)
Constant 3.463 2.815 3.405
(0.817)∗∗∗ (0.623)∗∗∗ (0.511)∗∗∗
Obs. 1,026 1,026 1,026
Robust standard errors below coeﬃcients in parentheses. Clustered at
hospital level. Signiﬁcance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. The signs of the
exogenous variables’ coeﬃcients are to be read as eﬀects on ineﬃciency.
16r =

n βn =0 .53 and 1
1−r =2 .15 according to Equation (3).16
Qualitatively the results are comparable to the ones before, except that
the estimated parameters of the exogenous variables are not individually sig-
niﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero at conventional levels. We tested for the case of
excluding the year dummy variable for year 2005 in the proﬁt frontier equa-
tion (results are not reported). This results in an increase of the constant term
equivalent to the coeﬃcient of the omitted year dummy variable. The coeﬃ-
cient on private ownership and the year dummy variables are then signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from zero for the two proﬁt measures EBIT and EP (”economic prof-
its”). This is the case since standard errors decrease more (by 1/3t o1 /4)
than the coeﬃcient on private ownership decreases (by 1/2). In the presented
models in Table 3 the exogenous variables (with and without year dummy
variables) are still jointly signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero when using EBIT
and EP as proﬁt proxies.
The following factors may explain the diﬀerences in the results across the
two models. First, as the cost eﬃciency results showed that private hospitals
are less technical and input allocative eﬃcient than public hospitals, we con-
clude that the private hospitals’ higher proﬁt eﬃciency of the ﬁrst model is due
to higher output allocative eﬃciency. This positive eﬀect seems to be domi-
nated by the negative eﬀect of input allocative ineﬃciency, which is introduced
in model (ii). Private hospitals would therefore manage better to produce an
eﬃcient output mix, given output prices, but perform worse with respect to
the input mix given input prices than public hospitals. Second, we restricted
model (ii) assuming input allocative eﬃciency to make it comparable to model
(i). This shows that normalising the input prices and the proﬁts with the
output price (base rate) explains the biggest part of the variation in results
although it does not play a role which input price is used in model (i). Third,
the new parameter and the generalisation of the model may come at a cost
of lower accuracy of the estimates. However, as shown below, the estimated
proﬁt eﬃciency scores of the diﬀerent ownership types are still signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent from each other, which means that private hospitals have a signiﬁ-
cantly higher average eﬃciency score than public and non-proﬁt hospitals also
in this general framework.
16The production function is speciﬁed as follows: we regress the number of doctors, of
nurses, of other staﬀ, and of beds as well as the three year dummies on the number of
weighted cases as discussed in Herr (2008). Then, we sum the coeﬃcients of the variable
inputs (thus excluding beds) to calculate the economies of scale based on x.
173.3 Estimated Eﬃciency Scores
In a last step, we use the stochastic frontier estimation results to estimate
expected eﬃciency scores. Estimated average cost eﬃciency is approximately
92%. Although the estimates vary in magnitudes, they show that the hospi-
tals in this study are relatively cost eﬃcient when we compare the ﬁndings
to former estimates of 82%-84% (Herr, 2008). The diﬀerence is due to the
diﬀerent samples used. In the ﬁrst study, we looked at all general hospitals
separately, while in this study, we consider less than one third of the hospitals
(on hospital chain level, reporting detailed balance sheets). Furthermore, the
cost eﬃciency scores imply that hospitals are quite technical and input alloca-
tive eﬃcient. Thus, low or negative proﬁts of some hospitals may be driven
by ouput allocative or scale ineﬃciency only. Finally, model (i), in which we
assume hospitals to be input allocative eﬃcient, may apply to our data since
on average input allocative eﬃciency is very high.
Proﬁt eﬃciency scores vary across models and proﬁt variables between
36% (EBIT) and 78% (EAT, both model (i)). In the two models presented,
average proﬁt eﬃciency for example using EAT as outcome is on average 78%
in model (i) and 68% in model (ii).17 Since proﬁt eﬃciency is a combination of
cost and revenue eﬃciency, proﬁt eﬃciency scores are (on average) lower than
cost eﬃciency scores.
To test for the diﬀerence in group means by ownership type, the standard
errors of the estimated group mean scores are obtained by a bootstrapping
procedure with 100 repetitions for the two preferred speciﬁcations and diﬀer-
ent cost and proﬁt measures. The two-sample t-tests with unequal variances
suggest that group means diﬀer signiﬁcantly from each other at a 5% level
over the years from 2002 to 2005. Public hospitals have a higher average cost
eﬃciency score than non-proﬁt competitors, while the latter are still more cost
eﬃcient than private hospitals. In contrast, private hospitals have on average
higher proﬁt eﬃciency scores than public hospitals across all models. As our
results suggest, the order of public and non-proﬁt hospitals is less clear and
varies across models. Considering EBIT for instance, non-proﬁt hospitals have
higher scores in model (i) but are not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent to public hospitals
in model (ii).
3.4 Robustness Checks
We conduct several robustness checks with respect to selection of output and
control variables and distributional assumptions.
17These values are presented for illustrative reasons and depend on model speciﬁcation
and the use of exogenous variables explaining ineﬃciency.
18First, we re-estimate the cost model not weighting the number of cases or
we include overall death rates in all models as a proxy for hospital quality
(results are not reported). We obtain the same results regarding the sign and
statistical signiﬁcance of the ownership indicators in the ineﬃciency equation.
The coeﬃcient of the mortality rate turned out not to be signiﬁcantly diﬀerent
from zero.
Second, we conduct a two-step SFA-approach in which, in the ﬁrst step, we
estimate the half-normal proﬁt frontier while accounting for allocative ineﬃ-
ciency and time ﬁxed eﬀects. In a second step, the estimated eﬃciency scores
are regressed on the exogenous variables. Although Wang and Schmidt (2002)
point out that both regressions lead into biased estimates due to contradictory
assumptions about the error terms in the two steps, this procedure has been
commonly applied in the literature (e.g. Rosko, 1999).
Third, we estimate a ﬁxed eﬀects approach on the standard proﬁt function
exploiting the structure of our panel data set. The ﬁxed eﬀects approach allows
us to relax the distributional assumption on the eﬃciency term. All we have
to assume is that the ineﬃciency is constant over time. Therefore, it can be
distinguished from a random error term that averages out over time.18 Using
the linear ﬁxed eﬀects approach, we calculate eﬃciency scores relative to the
lowest ﬁxed eﬀect in the sample, which can be negative. In a second step,
we regress the eﬃciency values estimated for each hospital on the exogenous
hospital characteristics as the ownership type in the last year of observation
of the hospital in our sample.
The regression results of both models are reported in Tables A-2 and A-
3. A positive sign of the coeﬃcients indicates higher proﬁt eﬃciency scores.
Qualitatively the results are comparable to the ones of Section 3. Private and
non-proﬁt hospitals are more proﬁt eﬃcient than public hospitals for most of
the proﬁt variables used. These models also suggest that non-proﬁt owner-
ship is correlated with higher proﬁt eﬃciency compared to public hospitals.
The weak results of the normal truncated normal models with respect to the
higher eﬃciency of hospitals located in eastern Germany are conﬁrmed by
these alternative speciﬁcations. The HHI, being higher when hospitals face
less competition in the market, is associated with higher proﬁt eﬃciency in
the two step model (Table A-2, EBIT and EP). Now, the other patients’ char-
acteristics also have individual explanatory power. However, it seems to make
a diﬀerence which proﬁt measure is used for one exogenous variable: Non-proﬁt
ownership is associated with higher proﬁts when considering EBIT, EAT, or
EP but changes signs when considering EBITDA in the ﬁxed estimation ap-
proach.
18For this approach we can only use hospitals with at least two observations in the panel.
19Table 4 shows pairwise correlation coeﬃcients between hospital rankings
obtained from the various models as well as between those hospital rankings
and other selected variables. Although diﬀerent distributional assumptions
result in diﬀerent magnitudes of the scores, our results turn out to be very
robust with respect to ranking. Since theoretically only a cost eﬃcient hospi-
tal can be fully proﬁt eﬃcient, the cost eﬃciency score ranking is positively
and signiﬁcantly correlated with the diﬀerent rankings of the proﬁt eﬃciency
models. However, as expected, the correlation is lower than between the proﬁt
eﬃciency rankings. In the lower part of the table we show that public hospitals
have a higher rank while private hospitals are correlated negatively with the
hospital ranking based on cost eﬃciency scores.
The proﬁt eﬃciency rankings are highly correlated by more than 93% when
looking at the same proﬁt measure (EBIT) and comparing the simple half nor-
mal model with model (ii). Furthermore, even the OLS ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁca-
tion is correlated by more than 48% with the two rankings of the two diﬀerent
SFA speciﬁcations. In the second part of the table, the negative correlation
coeﬃcients of beds, the base rate and CMI indicate that an increase in size,
output price or severity of illness is on average correlated with a lower hospital
rank. The ﬁxed eﬀects speciﬁcation diﬀers from the stochastic frontier estima-
tion by the sign on the correlations coeﬃcients of the base rate and the CMI.
In that speciﬁcation, they are correlated with a higher rank. Private (public)
ownership is again associated with higher (lower) ranks based on the proﬁt ef-
ﬁciency scores while non-proﬁt ownership is only signiﬁcantly correlated with
the ranking based on model (ii) (EAT).
4 Conclusion
This study is the ﬁrst to analyse both cost and proﬁt eﬃciency for German
hospitals and to compare cost and proﬁt eﬃciency analyses based on one data
set.
Our results provide ﬁrst insights into the question why private hospitals
on average generate higher proﬁts while simultaneously producing less cost
eﬃciently than public hospitals. In contrast to lower cost eﬃciency, private
and non-proﬁt ownership are associated with higher proﬁt eﬃciency compared
to public ownership in the time period from 2002 to 2005. This result is
robust to the choice of proxy to measure proﬁts, diﬀerent estimation techniques
and diﬀerent assumptions concerning the distribution of the ineﬃciency terms
(except of the lack of individual signiﬁcance of the ownership indicators in the
most general model (ii)).
The main result may partly be explained by the fact that hospitals of diﬀer-
20Table 4: Pairwise correlation coeﬃcients of proﬁt eﬃciency rankings across
diﬀerent models for the proﬁt variable EBIT.
SFA cost eﬀ SFA Proﬁt Eﬃciency Models OLS FE
truncated half-normal truncated, model (ii)
costs EBIT EBIT EAT EP EBIT









0.1244 0.7667 0.8253 1
SFA model (ii): EP 0.0757∗ 0.5519 0.5575 0.5269 1
OLS Fixed Eﬀects:
EBIT
0.4884 0.6205 0.5485 0.2636 1
Public 0.1261 -0.078∗ -0.2082 -0.2012 -0.1542 -0.2409
Non-proﬁt 0.073∗
Private -0.1183 0.074∗ 0.2001 0.1733 0.1737 0.3341
Beds -0.077∗ -0.1625 -0.1327 -0.3478 -0.065∗
base rate -0.2953 -0.1719 -0.079∗ -0.1042 -0.1016 0.066∗
CMI -0.2006 -0.1878 -0.072∗ -0.080∗ 0.1759
The highest eﬃciency score has the highest rank. Printed correlation coeﬃcients are signif-
icant at a 1% level, correlation coeﬃcients additionally marked with ∗ are signiﬁcant at a
5% level.
21ent ownership types behave diﬀerently because they target diﬀerent outcomes.
While public hospitals probably seek to minimise costs, private hospitals are
rather interested in maximising proﬁts. This conclusion may have an impact
on the future analysis of diﬀerences in the eﬃciency of hospitals, which is up
to date focusing on the measurement of cost eﬃciency.
From the perspective of a policy-maker, cost reduction may be preferred to
proﬁt maximisation in publicly ﬁnanced markets. However, higher proﬁts allow
hospitals to increase investments in their hospitals, e.g. in better technologies to
improve outcome quality. The ability to ﬁnance investments by own resources
becomes more and more important. Oﬃcially, hospital investments should be
ﬁnanced by the tax revenues of the federal states. However, in the last 20 years
the federal states have substantially reduced their engagement in ﬁnancing
hospital investments. Thus, only hospitals with suﬃciently high proﬁt margins
are able to ﬁll the gap between necessary investments on the one hand and
resources provided by the federal states on the other hand. Indeed Augurzky
et al. (2009) show that investment rates are higher for private hospitals.
Whether higher proﬁts are associated with better health care quality re-
mains an open question. Hospitals are reluctant to publish quality indicators
such as post-surgical infection rates and re-admission rates. Thus, we can-
not judge objectively for or against privatisation for example with respect to
cost-beneﬁt criteria.
However, under the assumption that outcome quality does not diﬀer be-
tween ownership types and since output prices are equal for all hospitals irre-
spective of ownership type, private hospitals are performing better in ﬁnancing
investments without recurring on taxpayers’ money. Further research has to
investigate quality diﬀerences between ownership types. Moreover, method-
ological improvements should be made by generalising the production func-
tion from a Cobb-Douglas to a translog type or by applying more advanced
panel data analyses. Finally, the empirical models should incorporate more
behavioural aspects of hospitals by ownership types.
Appendix
The inﬂuence of the exogenous variables on cost ineﬃciency of German hospi-
tals are given in Table A-1. The results of the robustness checks are presented
in Table A-2 (2-step SFA) as well as Table A-3 (ﬁxed eﬀects estimations).
22Table A-1: Cost eﬃciency, normal-truncated-normal model, SFA
truncated truncated w/o 2005
ln costs per doctor 0.086 0.096
(0.058) (0.058)∗
ln costs per other staﬀ 0.137 0.135
(0.046)∗∗∗ (0.045)∗∗∗
ln administr. costs per bed 0.039 0.039
(0.017)∗∗ (0.017)∗∗
ln material costs per bed 0.197 0.195
(0.024)∗∗∗ (0.024)∗∗∗
ln medical requirements per case 0.296 0.291
(0.033)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗
ln weighted cases 1.003 1.004
(0.013)∗∗∗ (0.013)∗∗∗



















ratio of female patients -7.380 -8.378
(8.628) (9.625)
year = 2003 0.665 0.658
(0.824) (0.854)
year = 2004 0.079 0.053
(0.375) (0.380)





Robust standard errors below coeﬃcients in parentheses. Clustered at
hospital level. Signiﬁcance levels: *: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%. The signs of the
exogenous variables’ coeﬃcients are to be read as eﬀects on ineﬃciency.
23Table A-2: Proﬁt eﬃciency, normal-half-normal model, SFA, accounting for
allocative ineﬃciency and year. Second Step: OLS, regressing estimated scores
on exogenous variables
EBITDA EBIT EAT EP
private 0.071 0.050 0.018 0.032
(0.014)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗
non-proﬁt -0.009 0.031 0.016 0.028
(0.011) (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.007)∗∗ (0.008)∗∗∗
eastern Germany 0.064 0.022 0.025 0.013
(0.012)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗ (0.007)∗∗∗ (0.009)
urban = 1 0.013 -0.008 -0.005 -0.017
(0.010) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)∗∗
HHI 0.024 0.031 0.015 0.025
(0.020) (0.015)∗∗ (0.013) (0.015)∗
ratio of elderly patients 0.146 0.123 0.024 0.126
(0.065)∗∗ (0.049)∗∗ (0.041) (0.048)∗∗∗
surgery-ratio -0.037 -0.019 -0.003 -0.027
(0.020)∗ (0.015) (0.012) (0.015)∗
ratio of female patients -0.179 0.042 -0.007 0.170
(0.073)∗∗ (0.055) (0.046) (0.054)∗∗∗
year = 2003 0.034 0.038 0.052 -0.009
(0.014)∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.009)∗∗∗ (0.010)
year = 2004 -0.008 0.017 0.014 0.037
(0.014) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)∗∗∗
year= 2005 -0.010 -0.053 0.045 -0.094
(0.015) (0.011)∗∗∗ (0.010)∗∗∗ (0.011)∗∗∗
Constant 0.499 0.523 0.59 0.607
(0.041)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗ (0.026)∗∗∗ (0.031)∗∗∗
Obs. 1,026 1,026 1,026 1,026
Robust standard errors below coeﬃcients in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels:
*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
24Table A-3: Proﬁt eﬃciency, OLS ﬁxed eﬀects in ﬁrst step. Second Step:
Regress scores on exogenous variables, OLS on last observation in sample
EBITDA EBIT EAT EP
private 0.029 0.075 0.020 -0.061
(0.013)∗∗ (0.014)∗∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.170)
non-proﬁt -0.023 0.017 0.014 -0.055
(0.011)∗∗ (0.011) (0.008)∗ (0.137)
eastern Germany 0.023 0.028 0.009 0.274
(0.011)∗∗ (0.011)∗∗ (0.008) (0.136)∗∗
urban 0.015 -0.006 0.003 0.069
(0.010) (0.010) (0.007) (0.124)
ratio of elderly patients -0.122 0.018 -0.008 0.077
(0.062)∗∗ (0.066) (0.044) (0.785)
surgery-ratio 0.021 0.040 0.009 -0.006
(0.023) (0.024)∗ (0.016) (0.289)
ratio of female patients -0.229 -0.251 -0.077 0.167
(0.076)∗∗∗ (0.081)∗∗∗ (0.055) (0.970)
Constant 0.207 0.109 0.029 -0.212
(0.040)∗∗∗ (0.042)∗∗ (0.028) (0.504)
Obs. 364 364 364 364
Robust standard errors below coeﬃcients in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels:
*: 10%, **: 5%, ***: 1%
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